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Letter dated 5 March 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 27 February 2013 from Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union. Enclosed with the letter is the report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

In the letter, the Commissioner informs the Security Council that the African Union Peace and Security Council has endorsed the option for the enhancement of AMISOM, and urges the Security Council to take the decisions of the Peace and Security Council into consideration as it deliberates the next resolution on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM.

I should be grateful if you would bring this request to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 27 February 2013 from the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission, I would like to forward herewith the communiqué adopted at the 356th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, held on 27 February 2013, to consider the outcome of the AMISOM strategic review.

As you are aware, the review was necessitated by the encouraging evolution of the situation in Somalia, both in terms of security and political process. It sought to adjust the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and the African Union's role to the new realities on the ground and to better support the efforts of the Somali authorities towards the stabilization of the situation.

Based on the recommendations of the review, and bearing in mind other relevant factors, the Peace and Security Council has endorsed the option of the enhancement of AMISOM. The implementation of such an option will require an improved support package to enable the Mission to discharge its mandate.

As the Security Council carries out consultations on its next resolution on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, it is our hope that the decision taken by the Peace and Security Council and requests addressed to this organ will be adequately taken into account. I would like to add that throughout the review process the African Union maintained close consultations with the United Nations, especially as it was undertaking a similar exercise. It would be highly appreciated if this letter and the attached report of the African Union strategic review of AMISOM are circulated to the members of the Security Council for their information and action as appropriate.

Undoubtedly, Somalia has made tremendous progress over the past months. However, the situation remains very fragile and the gains recorded could be easily reversed. Accordingly, continued and coordinated efforts by the African Union and the United Nations will be critical in the months and years to come. Every effort should be made to maintain and increase international engagement in Somalia, so as to ensure that the investment made bears the expected results.

I would like to reiterate the African Union's deep appreciation of the Security Council's support and your personal commitment and that of the Secretariat.

(*Signed*) Ramtane **Lamamra**
Commissioner, Peace and Security

Enclosure I

[Original: English and French]

Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

I. Introduction

1. The situation in Somalia has undergone a fundamental change with the transfer of power from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with the election of a new President in September 2012. The Transitional Roadmap would not have been successfully implemented, but for the huge commitment and enormous sacrifices made by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and their international partners, to enhance security. These significant developments in Somalia have made it necessary for the African Union and its international partners to undertake a strategic review of AMISOM.

2. The objective of the strategic review is to determine how best AMISOM can further contribute to the stabilization of Somalia and align its activities to the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia.

3. To undertake the Review, the AU Commission appointed a five-member team of experts chaired by Professor Ibrahim Gambari.[1] The Review Team was supported by a secretariat made up of civilian, police and military officers from AMISOM and the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission. In addition, four senior officials from the Federal Government of Somalia participated in the Review.

4. The team consulted with the President of Somalia and key members of his cabinet in Mogadishu, with AMISOM troop and police contributing countries and with key regional and international partners in December 2012 and January 2013. It also consulted with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, notably the United States and the United Kingdom.

II. Brief strategic analysis of developments in Somalia

5. Major security gains in Somalia over the last 18 months have created an enabling environment for the successful completion of the transitional period and the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. These developments presented a strategic opportunity for the international community to support, in creative and concrete ways, the Federal Government of Somalia to consolidate the peace process. The peaceful transfer of power to the Federal Government of Somalia in September 2012, brings a successful end to the 8 year transition period that began in 2004. The new political reality and the recent military gains against the Al Shabaab provided the

[1] The other members of the team were Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Louis M. Fisher, Mr. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, Dr. Cedric de Coning and Col. (Rtd.) Festus B. Aboagye.

Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and the international community with a strategic opportunity to consolidate the political and security gains made thus far, by investing in the restoration and extension of state authority through effective governance, rule of law and the delivery of peace dividends.

6. The Review Team has noted that the Government has articulated a Six Pillar policy framework and that it is planning to review the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP).

Six Pillar policy framework

7. The Six Pillar strategy is a comprehensive policy framework outlined by the President of Somalia for the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, around which the AU and the international community should align its support. The six pillars are:

(a) *Full Stability* — Supremacy of the law and good governance, that incorporates rule of law and security;

(b) *Economic Recovery* — Livelihoods and economic infrastructure;

(c) *Peacebuilding* — Social reconciliation through building bridges of trust;

(d) *Service Delivery* — Health, education and environment;

(e) *International Relations* — Building collaborative relations and polishing the national image; and

(f) *The Unity and Integrity of the country* — Striving together for a better future.

National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP)

8. The NSSP provides for immediate, medium and long-term priority actions to strengthen the security and justice sector institutions in Somalia. It outlines the national security vision of Somalia as follows:

> "A Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule of law; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend its constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity".

9. The strategic objectives of the NSSP are as follows:

(a) To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and Coordination Mechanisms;

(b) To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security, justice and Custodian Corps Agencies and Institutions;

(c) To ensure effective partnership and coordination between State and non-State security and justice agencies/institutions;

(d) To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector development efforts;

(e) To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of Somalia.

Security situation

10. A significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the entire territory of the country still requires a significant sustained effort. The Federal Government of Somalia has outlined the recovery of remaining areas as a key priority. However, the Government recognizes that there has to be a balance between consolidation of gains made and further expansion of areas under its control.

11. The security situation in Somalia has significantly improved in those areas recovered to date, but it is still fragile and the gains can be reversed if not consolidated. The main risks are the absence of effective government institutions that are capable of delivering state services and managing inter-clan conflict. This is exacerbated by Al Shabaab exploiting the situation, as well as by piracy, banditry and lawlessness.

12. Al Shabaab is increasingly under pressure due to heavy losses, internal leadership wrangles as well as inability to pay its fighters as a result of loss of key revenue sources. This has resulted in the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM having to manage defectors and captives without a comprehensive plan.

Socioeconomic situation

13. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains critical. There is widespread poverty and malnutrition and large portions of the countryside remain very vulnerable to changing weather conditions. There are currently 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia and 1 million refugees in neighbouring countries. The IDPs in Somalia face major protection challenges including abuse, crime, aid diversion and forced evictions.

14. However, safety and living conditions have improved in the recovered areas. Attacks on humanitarian workers have significantly declined. There is a noticeable increase in economic activities. Large numbers of people are returning to Mogadishu and other areas, and many are reconstructing their homes and are engaging in business activities.

International cooperation and partnerships

15. A large number of international and regional organizations, as well as bilateral partners, are supporting the peace process in Somalia. IGAD and the AU have been the leading regional partners and have been instrumental in the process that resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in 2004. The United Nations has played an important role in Somalia since the 1990s. More recently, the United Nations through its Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) has facilitated the transition.

16. AMISOM has been supported by the United Nations and the European Union (EU), as well as bilateral partners. However, these financing contributions only cover specified areas and periods; hence, funding for AMISOM remains unpredictable and unreliable. The international financial crisis that has negatively affected the AU's partners has further compounded funding for AMISOM.

17. The Review Team has noted that there is need for enhanced coherence and predictability in the support provided by the international community to Somalia,

including for AMISOM. The Federal Government of Somalia on its part has expressed frustration at the high transaction costs associated with having to deal with an incoherent and highly divergent set of multilateral and bilateral international partners.

18. From its consultations with key stakeholders, the Review Team has observed the following challenges:

(a) Unpredictable funding;

(b) Inadequate logistic support in the newly recovered areas;

(c) Uncoordinated partner funding and support;

(d) Lack of transparency in the management of partners' contributions;

(e) Lack of funding for capacity-building for Somalia defence and public safety institutions;

(f) Inadequate funding for quick-impact projects (QIPs) that can support urgent projects, and contribute to tangible peace dividends, in newly recovered areas;

(g) Inadequate and delayed deployment of approved personnel and resources, and;

(h) Lack of air capability.

III. Assessment of AMISOM

Mandate

19. AMISOM's mandate was at the onset crafted to support Somalia's TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conditions conducive for long term reconstruction and development. The mandate has been reviewed at regular intervals, for instance most recently to encompass support to the Federal Government of Somalia through United Nations Security Council resolution 2073 adopted on 7 November 2012, which extended AMISOM mandate up to 7 March 2013, pending this strategic review.

Civilian component

20. AMISOM's civilian component includes political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information, gender and mission analysis and planning capacities. The civilian staff performed their duties from Nairobi until the security situation improved and they were deployed in Mogadishu in 2009. The civilian component of AMISOM has contributed significantly to the successful completion of the transitional period through political advice, facilitation and capacity-building, supporting governance both nationally and in Mogadishu, and by facilitating humanitarian assistance.

21. AMISOM's civilian component will need to be enhanced to enable it support the mission's consolidation and stabilization efforts in the new areas recovered from Al Shabaab, including in the areas of governance, reconciliation, human rights, gender and early recovery at local community level.

Military component

22. AMISOM's military component has had considerable operational success. However, with current force strength, and without critical multipliers and enablers such as a guard force and air assets, AMISOM will be constrained in its ability to expand its area of operations. Without these multipliers and enablers, AMISOM would require additional forces if it were to expand its area of operations. AMISOM will not be able to recover the remaining areas until such time that the SNSF has developed the necessary capacity to take over responsibility for the security of the recovered areas.

23. An important assumption thus is that the Federal Government of Somalia will receive the support necessary for it to significantly enhance the capacity of the SNSF so that they are able to take over responsibility for security from AMISOM. Simultaneously, AMISOM's capacity to conduct training and to support the capacity-building of the SNSF will need to be enhanced. Currently, AMISOM does not have a training team dedicated to this task.

24. The need for multipliers and enablers thus remains critical for AMISOM to complete its mandate. These assets and capabilities can be used to target Al Shabaab's strategic resources, provide air cover for supply convoys, and help the force to reach areas where AMISOM currently has little or no presence.

Police component

25. The mandate of the AMISOM Police component is to develop and implement comprehensive strategies to support the Somalia Police Force (SPF) in order to build its operational, training, administrative and management capacity; to re-equip and rehabilitate its infrastructure; and to mobilize and manage its resources. The AMISOM Police is also required to enforce the maintenance of public order and to protect Somali citizens, especially the vulnerable groups.

26. It has a mandated strength of 1,680. Currently it has 362 deployed personnel consisting of two Formed Police Units (FPU) of 140 personnel each, 76 individual police officers and a senior leadership team of 6 officers. It is therefore imperative that the mandated strength be deployed to enable fully implement its mandate.

Mission support

27. AMISOM has a complex mission support structure which includes a limited United Nations logistical support package delivered by UNSOA, bilateral support to the AU to cater for the operational overheads of all AMISOM personnel and bilateral support provided to police and troop contributing countries to AMISOM. Currently, the United Nations support package is being provided to 17,731 uniformed and 70 civilian personnel. The logistic support package provided by the United Nations has contributed significantly to the success achieved by AMISOM, but it is limited in the type of support it can provide. It would need to be enhanced if it is going to be able to support AMISOM operations at the scale, tempo and intensity needed to expand its operations across Somalia.

IV. Support to State institutions

28. AMISOM's End State is closely tied to the development of the institutional capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia, so that its key state institutions can ensure justice, rule of law, effective governance and the provision of basic public services.

29. To realize the critical goal of enhancing the capacity of the Defence and Public Safety institutions, there is need for:

(a) The Federal Government of Somalia to review the NSSP, and its implementation mechanisms, so that it can form a comprehensive road map for capacity-building;

(b) The establishment of training teams and training facilities in each sector. In addition, efforts to identify countries in the region with existing facilities that can offer specialised training should continue, and;

(c) The Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of international partners to recruit and train additional personnel, and;

(d) The Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of international partners to provide dedicated resources for equipment, uniforms, medical care and remuneration for the Somalia Defence and Public Safety institutions.

Management of disengaged fighters

30. There are two categories of disengaged fighters; those who have been arrested or captured in combat and those who have surrendered to AMISOM or SNSFs. The Federal Government of Somalia, in collaboration with AMISOM and other partners, has developed a plan that needs to be improved upon in order to develop a comprehensive strategy.

V. Recommendations

Strategic guidance

31. Based on the strategic analysis, the assessment of AMISOM and consultations with stakeholders, five key factors emerged that should be taken into account when considering the future support for the Somalia peace process and in particular the Federal Government of Somalia:

(a) *Enhance coherence in support*: The Federal Government of Somalia, the AU, the United Nations and all the international partners called for enhanced coherence and predictability in the support provided by the international community and expressed frustration at the high transaction cost associated with having to deal with an incoherent and highly divergent set of multilateral and bilateral international partners.

(b) *Predictable funding*: There is general frustration at the lack of predictable funding for AMISOM, which spills over into uncertainty and fragility for the consolidation of the peace process in Somalia. Any future mission should thus be organized in such a way that its funding arrangements are predictable enough so as to avoid a negative effect on the fragility of the Somali peace process.

(c) *Consolidation of security*: The security situation in Somalia has improved in those areas recovered to date, but it is still fragile, and the gains can be reversed if

not consolidated. The main risks are absence of effective government institutions that are capable of delivering state services and managing inter-clan conflict.

(d) *Recovery of territory*: A significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the remaining territory of Somalia still requires a significant sustained effort. The Federal Government of Somalia has outlined the recovery of remaining areas as a key priority. However, the Government recognizes that there has to be a balance between consolidation of gains made and further expansion of areas under its control.

(e) *Robust peace enforcement*: AMISOM needs a robust peace enforcement capacity to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to recover remaining areas under Al Shabaab control as well as consolidate the already recovered areas.

32. On the basis of these key factors, the Review Team recommends that any future mission that aims to support the Federal Government of Somalia must be a joined up and fully supported mission with clear strategic direction, and that there has to be a mechanism that ensures effective coordination among the international partners and the Federal Government of Somalia at all levels.

Main effort

33. The main effort for the consolidation of peace in Somalia lies in the provision of security, effective governance, rule of law and basic services. Effective governance would offer the people of Somalia a clear choice between extremism and lawlessness on the one hand, and safety and justice on the other.

End State

34. The role of any future peace support operation in Somalia would be to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to provide effective governance by contributing to conducive political and security environment that enables the enhancement of security, rule of law and the provision of basic services. The envisaged end state would be a significantly depleted military and related capacity of Al Shabaab and the threat it poses to Somalia and the subregion; enhanced capacity and cohesion of the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions to assume primary responsibility for the security of the state and its citizens. This will then facilitate the expansion of the Federal Government of Somalia's authority across the country and enable the creation of a stable, secure Somalia whose citizens enjoy access to justice and the rule of law.

Strategic objectives

35. On the basis of the Main Effort and the End State, the strategic objectives of any future peace support operations would be to:

(a) Secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia;

(b) Enhance the capacity of the defence and public safety institutions;

(c) Support the establishment of effective governance, and;

(d) Facilitate the conduct of general elections by 2016.

Objective one: Secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia

36. Support the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to neutralise and weaken Al Shabaab by gradually expanding the control of the Government throughout the territory of Somalia. The next logical step in a staged approach would be the recovery of the strategic areas on the Somalia coast by the end of 2013 or as conditions may dictate, in order to deny Al Shabaab access to commercial and criminal revenue as well as resupply. This could be followed by recovering the remaining key inland towns by end of 2014, and eventually to recover the entire territory of Somalia by end of 2015. This two year timeline is decisive but subject to periodic review, based on the prevailing conditions.

Objective two: Enhance the capacity of defence and public safety institutions

37. Support the Federal Government of Somalia to enhance the capacity of its Defence and Public Safety Institutions. The peace support operation's end state in this context would be to assist the SNSF to develop the capacity to eventually take full responsibility for its own security by 2020.

38. The Federal Government of Somalia, with support from the peace support operation and bilateral partners, should develop a national capacity-building plan that builds on the NSSP, and that provides for a gradual handover of responsibility to the SNSF. Such a gradual enhancement of capacity should be linked to the peace support operation's consolidation, handover, drawdown and withdrawal benchmarks. In this regard, a comprehensive strategy and plan of action for building the Somalia National Army (SNA) and the SPF should be developed.

Objective three: Support the establishment of effective governance

39. Support the Federal Government of Somalia to enhance the functioning of existing institutions and establish new ones as necessary to oversee and implement the Government's Six Pillar policy framework. Further to this would be support for the re-establishment of local administrations in the recovered areas, in close cooperation with the United Nations and other partners.

Objective four: Facilitate the conduct of general elections by 2016

40. Support the Federal Government of Somalia to successfully organize free and fair general elections by 2016.

41. Under the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia, appropriate benchmarks, timelines and responsibilities should be developed to guide the actualisation of these objectives.

Peace support operation phases

42. Taking into account the Main Effort, End State and Objectives discussed above, a future peace support operation should consider a phased approach:

Phase one: Territorial recovery and consolidation (2013-2017)

In this phase, the peace support operation supports the SNSF to recover territory from Al Shabaab, and supports the Federal Government of Somalia to establish effective governance in those areas already recovered. It is projected

that the SNSF and the peace support operation will be in control of the entire territory of Somalia by end 2015, with a view to general elections being held by 2016. These dates are subject to review based on the prevailing conditions.

There is an overlap with Phase Two in that the peace support operation should start to handover security responsibility for certain areas to the SNSF as soon as the SNSF has developed the capacity to do so. The peace support operation should retain the capacity to support the SNSF, even once they have assumed responsibility, as necessary.

Phase two: Handover and drawdown (2016-2018)

In this phase, the handover of responsibility to the SNSF will be gradually increased in a staged and orderly manner, until the SNSF has assumed primary responsibility for the security of the entire territory of Somalia by 2018, or earlier, as conditions may dictate. The peace support operation will retain the capacity to support the SNSF throughout the country, so that it can respond should the SNSF come under pressure in any location. Efforts to support effective governance and to build the capacity of the SNSF are intensified.

As the SNSF assumes more responsibility the peace support operation could start to scale down its forces and adjust its capabilities.

Phase three: Drawdown and withdrawal (2017-2020)

In this phase, the scale down continues until eventually all forces exit Somalia by 2020, or earlier, as conditions may dictate.

Options for the configuration of a future mission

43. From the analysis of AMISOM, it has become clear that the mission faces many challenges despite the success it has achieved so far. Whilst the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and the United Nations agree that the coordination and cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and various United Nations entities need to be significantly improved, the main constraint AMISOM faces is one of resources.

44. The resources currently available to AMISOM through the limited United Nations support arrangement and international partners will not allow the significant expansion into new areas of operations. The Federal Government of Somalia needs AMISOM to assist the SNSF to recover the entire territory of Somalia by 2015, in time for the general elections by 2016.

45. The Review Team has thus come to the conclusion that the status quo is not an option. The Team has examined various additional options and has decided to present three options to the AUC for consideration, namely:

Option 1: Handover AMISOM to the United Nations.

Option 2: Enhance AMISOM.

Option 3: Establish a new joint AU-United Nations mission.

Option 1: Handover AMISOM to the United Nations

46. As the AU is not able to generate predictable funding for AMISOM, it has on several occasions in the past requested the United Nations to take over responsibility for the peace operations in Somalia. The United Nations has in principle agreed to take over responsibility for peace operations in Somalia, but it has indicated that the prevailing conditions are not yet conducive for a United Nations peacekeeping operation. As Al Shabaab still controls considerable territory in south central Somalia, any peace operation that is mandated to support the SNSF to extend its control over the entire territory will require a peace enforcement mandate, robust rules of engagement and offensive capabilities.

Option 2: Enhance AMISOM

47. As highlighted above, the current situation is that AMISOM is unable to significantly expand its area of operations because of resource constraints. There is thus a serious gap between the support that AMISOM can provide and the scale, tempo and intensity of operations that the Federal Government of Somalia would like to see. In order to assist the Federal Government of Somalia to expand its control over the entire territory of Somalia, AMISOM would require additional personnel as well as multipliers and enablers.

48. If the United Nations Security Council approves an enhanced support package that enables AMISOM to increase and sustain the scale, tempo and intensity of its operations, the mission would be able to expand its area of operations. However, an absolute prerequisite for this option is that the AU's international partners are willing to provide a comprehensive support package including uniformed personnel reimbursements and logistics equal to the support provided to a United Nations mission, but with enhanced scales and standards for peace enforcement that will enable it to achieve its mandate in a reasonable time frame.

Option 3: Establish a new joint AU-United Nations mission

49. Under this option an AU peace support operation (AMISOM) could be joined up with a United Nations peacebuilding office in a structural arrangement that:

(a) Ensures joint AU-United Nations political direction and leadership;

(b) Ensures AMISOM has the necessary resources from the United Nations to pursue its mandate, and;

(c) Ensures that AMISOM retains its multidimensional character, and a mandate that allows it to use the levels of force necessary to support the Federal Government of Somalia to recover and secure those areas still under the control of Al Shabaab.

Recommended option

50. As the status quo is not an option, and as option 1 (United Nations peacekeeping) is not feasible at this stage, the two remaining options are option 2 (enhanced AMISOM) and option 3 (a new joint AU-United Nations mission). As option 2 does not address the concern over predictable funding for AMISOM, the Review Team recommends option 3.

51. The Review Team however, envisages option 2 serving as an interim arrangement that will facilitate a transition towards the realization of the joint AU-United Nations mission including undertaking technical assessment and agreeing its relevant management and operational modalities. The transition period will also allow for the necessary enhancement of AMISOM including a new mandate, enhancing its multidimensional character and provision of the required human and technical resources such as multipliers and enablers. In the meantime the Federal Government of Somalia will require support to maintain the pressure on Al Shabaab, otherwise the gains reached to date may start to erode. As the requirements are known and the support modalities are in place, an enhanced AMISOM would be able to step up its tempo relatively soon after such additional assets, multipliers and enablers have arrived in the mission.

52. The Review Team therefore recommends that a new joint AU-United Nations mission be established. Such a mission should bring together an African Union peace support operation (AMISOM), a United Nations peacebuilding office and a joint mission support.

53. The joint mission needs to be led by a Joint AU-United Nations Special Representative who is appointed by, and reports to both the AU and the United Nations. The Joint Special Representative (JSR) needs to be supported by a joint coordination mechanism that ensures strategic coherence between the AU Commission and United Nations Secretariat.

54. The Office of the Joint Special Representative should have the capacity to integrate and coordinate AMISOM, the United Nations peacebuilding support office and the joint mission support. In addition, the Joint Special Representative should chair a mechanism that brings together all senior AU and United Nations leadership functions. The Joint Special Representative should also co-chair, together with an appropriate Federal Government of Somalia representative, a mechanism that coordinates the support that all international partners provide to the Federal Government of Somalia.

55. A Deputy Special Representative, appointed by the AU should lead AMISOM. The AMISOM part of the joint mission will be a multidimensional peace support operation that consists of a civilian, police, military and two support components, one for administration and one for finance. The AU has invested considerable resources over the last decade in developing military, police and civilian capabilities as part of its efforts to develop a multidimensional African Standby Force capacity. In this regard, the Review Team has noted that considerable expertise has been developed in AMISOM to date, and it recommends that steps should be taken to ensure that the AU's multidimensional peace support operations capacity not be eroded in the transition to a joint AU-United Nations mission.

56. The Review Team envisages a clear division of labour between the AU peace support operation and the United Nations peacebuilding office. The peacebuilding office can be responsible for supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in the areas of peacebuilding, governance and Rule of Law. AMISOM will pursue the four objectives discussed earlier. The AU multidimensional peace support operation will require, amongst others, the ability to do mission analysis and planning; to provide political analysis and reporting; to represent the mission at the subnational level to local authorities; to generate public information, to promote gender mainstreaming, to ensure conduct and discipline is maintained and to manage a strategy for the

protection of civilians. Such a clear division of tasks, based on the respective mandates of the two entities, should avoid the risk of duplication and overlap between the peace support operation and the peacebuilding office. The joint coordination mechanism overseen by the Office of the Joint Special Representative, should further be able to manage any areas of potential overlap that may arise.

57. The joint AU-United Nations mission should be supported by a mission support structure that provides support to the Office of the Joint Special Representative, AMISOM and the United Nations special political mission or peacebuilding office.

58. The Review Team noted that past experiences have shown that such joint structural arrangements come with their own challenges and high transaction costs for both the AU and the United Nations. In this regard, the Review Team is of the opinion that these challenges should be addressed and the transaction costs absorbed by the AU and the United Nations.

59. However, in the interim, the Review Team recommends that the AU and United Nations should explore modalities for an enhanced support package for AMISOM. The Review Team visualizes a graduated transition within a timeframe of 12 months with effect from the date of the next mandate. During this transition period, an enhanced AMISOM will continue with peace enforcement operations with a robust mandate. Modalities for the transition to the enhanced AMISOM and a future joint AU-United Nations mission should include:

(a) Multipliers and enablers for the mission to facilitate continued territorial recovery and domination of areas under the control of Al Shabaab.

(b) Special training teams that can build the capacity of Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions.

(c) Enhanced civilian capacity to facilitate and support the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to restore effective governance, human rights, rule of law, and justice in the recovered areas.

(d) Funding of uniformed personnel reimbursements from United Nations assessed contributions.

(e) Taking into account the need for coherence and predictability in the support provided to the SNSF, the Review Team recommends that the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) co-chairs, together with an appropriate Federal Government of Somalia representative, a mechanism that coordinates the support all international partners provide to the SNSF.

60. During this period, the AUC should create the necessary synergies between the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Africa Governance Architecture (AGA). This would broaden the AU's engagement in Somalia beyond peace and security interventions to include the necessary governance interventions in line with the Six Pillar policy framework of the Federal Government of Somalia. In this respect, the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security should coordinate their efforts accordingly.

61. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the joint SNSF-AMISOM operations, the AU should request the United Nations Security Council to:

(a) Suspend those provisions of the arms embargo on Somalia that will enable the Federal Government of Somalia to re-equip and resupply with the required category of arms, and;

(b) To authorize the provision of logistical support, from assessed contributions, to the SNSF by UNSOA.

Enclosure II

[Original: English and French]

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 356th meeting held on 27 February 2013, adopted the following decision on the Strategic Review of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the Report of the Commission on the Strategic Review of the AU Mission in Somalia [PSC/PR/2(CCCLVI)];

2. **Recalls** its previous decisions and press statements on the situation in Somalia, in particular press statement PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXXXVII), adopted at its 337th meeting held on 11 October 2012, in which Council expressed full support to the decision of the Commission to undertake a strategic review of AMISOM and the implementation of its mandate, and communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCL), adopted at its 350th meeting held on 14 January 2013, in which Council took note of the preliminary findings of the Review and stressed the need for this exercise to lead to the enhancement of the effectiveness of AMISOM and strengthened coordination, as well as the imperative to address the issue of sustainable and predictable funding for the next phase of the Mission;

3. **Reiterates** its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia;

4. **Welcomes** the continuing security gains being recorded in the country by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), with the support of AMISOM and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF). Council **commends, once again**, AMISOM for its outstanding contribution to the improvement of security in Somalia, the stabilization of the country and furtherance of the reconciliation process, and **takes note with satisfaction of** the relocation, to Mogadishu, of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the completion of the deployment of the Djiboutian contingent in Sector 4 and the imminent deployment of the Sierra-Leonean contingent in Sector 2. Council **reiterates its appreciation** to AMISOM troop (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda) and police (Nigeria and Uganda and the countries providing individual police officers) contributing countries, as well as to Ethiopia, for their commitment and sacrifices. Council **further reiterates its appreciation** to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union (EU) and its Member States, the United Nations (UN) and bilateral partners, notably the United Kingdom and the United States, for their invaluable contribution to the peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia;

5. **Recalls** the tremendous progress made in the political and reconciliation process in Somalia. Council **emphasizes** that the Somalis, in particular their political, clan and religious leaders, have the principal responsibility for the consolidation of peace and security in their country, and **strongly urges** the political leadership of Somalia and all other stakeholders, in the best interest of Somalia, to continue to show selfless leadership, resolve and unity of purpose, for without such

dispositions, no amount of external assistance will make it possible to consolidate the gains that have been made in Somalia;

6. **Reaffirms AU's full support** to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its commitment to continue to assist the FGS in its stabilization and reconstruction efforts, including the implementation of the Government's Six-Pillar strategy;

7. **Welcomes** the outcome of the Commission's Strategic Review of AMISOM, including the recommendations regarding the Main Effort, End State and Strategic Objectives for the AU in Somalia. Council notes the three options contained in the Review Report regarding the future configuration of AMISOM (paragraphs 43 to 49), namely: (1) handing over of AMISOM to the United Nations, (2) enhancing AMISOM, and (3) a joint AU-United Nations mission, with option 2 serving as a transition phase in this scenario. Council **reiterates AU's long-standing position** on the need for the United Nations Security Council, in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to authorize the deployment, in Somalia, of a United Nations operation that would take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of the country;

8. **Endorses**, in light of current realities and constraints and as an interim arrangement, the recommendation to enhance AMISOM, as contained in paragraph 47 and 48, and 59 to 61 of the Review Report, which notably requires the Mission to: (a) maintain a robust posture, with the required multipliers and enablers, in order to facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al Shabaab, (b) establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia's National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, and (c) enhance its civilian capacity to support the FGS efforts to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation, human rights and rule of law, and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas;

9. **Recalls** the mandate of AMISOM, as contained in its communiqué PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), adopted at its 69th meeting held on 19 January 2007. Council **decides**, in view of the evolution of the situation and the need to consolidate the gains made along the parameters outlined in paragraph 8 above, that AMISOM, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, shall be mandated to:

(a) Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(b) Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory;

(c) Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services;

(d) Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions;

(e) Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution;

(f) Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees;

(g) Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and;

(h) Provide protection to AU and United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence;

10. **Expresses appreciation** to the United Nations Security Council for the support extended to AMISOM, as provided for in its resolutions 1863 (2009), 2036 (2012) and 2073 (2012), and delivered through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Council **welcomes** the good and collaborative working relationship between AMISOM and UNSOA;

11. **Calls upon** the United Nations Security Council to authorize the enhancement of the support package to AMISOM, to enable it to discharge its mandate effectively. Council **further calls upon** the United Nations Security Council to ensure that the configuration of the envisaged United Nations Mission in Somalia, as foreseen in the context of the Strategic Review of the United Nations presence in Somalia, does not, in any way, impede or constrain the capacity and flexibility of UNSOA to provide unfettered support to AMISOM in accordance with its mandate as outlined above, particularly in the conduct of peace enforcement operations;

12. **Stresses the need** for effective and coordinated efforts to secure Somalia's coastline to deprive Al Shabaab of means and resources to carry out its terrorist activities. In this respect, and bearing in mind the AMISOM maritime requirements, as outlined in the Strategic Concept for AMISOM Future Operations, adopted at its 306th meeting held on 5 January 2012 [PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVI)], and the imperative of building a capable Somali coast guard, Council **requests** the Commission to undertake the necessary consultations with the Somali Government, bearing in mind its position on this matter, with a view to urgently reaching an agreement on the way forward, so as to facilitate the mobilization of international support, including from the United Nations;

13. **Requests** the United Nations Security Council, whilst recognizing the sovereign responsibility of Somalia to build its own defence and public safety institutions, to authorize measures to ensure predictable support for the development of the Somalia security sector, with adequate civilian and administrative oversight, including the provision of basic logistical support to the Somalia forces undertaking joint operations with AMISOM forces, as well as the supply of weapons within a transparent and orderly framework, notably the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia as it relates to the SNSF, while maintaining it against non-State actors;

14. **Stresses** that the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia requires the effective involvement of the United Nations. In this respect, Council **welcomes** the steps being taken by the Commission to engage the United Nations to facilitate greater and enhanced coordination of efforts between the AU and United

Nations in Somalia, in order to consolidate the security gains made on the ground and to create an enabling environment for reconstruction and peacebuilding;

15. **Calls on** AU member states and international partners to extend to Somalia all the required financial, technical and economic support to facilitate recovery efforts, improve livelihoods and create conditions for sustainable peace, security and stability. In this respect, Council **requests** the Commission to enhance its efforts towards the mobilization, within the framework of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI), of greater support from member states and relevant AU institutions, including NEPAD and the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR), bearing in mind, with respect to the latter, that livestock remains a key sector of the Somali economy and livelihoods. Council **also requests** the Commission to take steps to actively engage international partners and financial institutions, namely the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and relevant regional institutions, to step up their efforts in support of Somalia. In this respect, Council **welcomes** the recent visit to Mogadishu, with AU support, of an AfDB team;

16. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit this communiqué to the United Nations Security Council to seek its support, and to actively engage all AU partners to mobilize further support for the implementation of the revised AMISOM mandate;

17. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 4 March 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith the recorded infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey, committed during the month of January 2013 (see annex). I have the honour to draw your attention to the systematic infringement by Turkey of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus by blatantly violating international rules in a way that seriously jeopardizes international aviation safety in the region.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-25186 (E) 120313

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 4 March 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 January 2013	1022 to 1140	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
8 January 2013	0935 to 1015	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1330 to 1427	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
9 January 2013	0927 to 1529	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1705 to 1800	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
10 January 2013	1347 to 1406	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1650 to 1707	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
11 January 2013	0940 to 1502	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	0950 to 1025	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
15 January 2013	1150 to 1720	One C-560 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
16 January 2013	1116 to 1135	One T-41 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
17 January 2013	0836 to 0925	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1259 to 1400	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
18 January 2013	0908 to 0945	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1504 to 1544	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
21 January 2013	0920 to 1002	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1350 to 1429	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
22 January 2013	0928 to 1020	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1105 to 1245	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
23 January 2013	1417 to 1429	Two RF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1419 to 1433	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1512 to 1610	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
24 January 2013	1303 to 1422	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
25 January 2013	0948 to 1227	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1124 to 1155	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1451 to 1606	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
28 January 2013	1006 to 1034	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1109 to 1129	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1123 to 1202	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1410 to 1420	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1425 to 1446	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1620 to 1647	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
29 January 2013	0732 to 0752	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	0840 to 0858	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1008 to 1105	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1222 to 1317	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1514 to 1528	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1808 to 1900	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1850 to 1917	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
30 January 2013	1013 to 1106	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1221 to 1237	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1417 to 1504	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1624 to 1715	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
31 January 2013	1018 to 1114	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1033 to 1048	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1213 to 1305	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1319 to 1450	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1421 to 1505	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.
	1701 to 1717	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting Nicosia ACC.